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The Appellee, Daniel Baggett, by his attorneys of record, respectfully submits this
brief pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal arises
from the Utah State Tax Commission's (the 'Tax Commission") Order dated June 26,
2003 and its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision dated June 26,
2003 ("Final Decision").
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Daniel Baggett and his wife Vicki Baggett (collectively the "Baggetts") believe
the issues on appeal and the appropriate "standards of review" are more properly framed
as stated below, rather than as referenced in the Brief of the Appellant, the Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization (the "Board").
ISSUE NO. 1
Did the Tax Commission err by valuing the Baggetts' contaminated land at zero in
accordance with the methodology the Tax Commission used in Schmidt v. County Bd. of
Equalization of Salt Lake County, Appeal No. 96-0914 (October 7, 1997), aff d, Schmidt
v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d 690?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
In affirming the Tax Commission's decision in Schmidt, the Utah Supreme Court
noted, "[T]he choice of valuation methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a
question of fact." Id. at \6 (citations omitted). This Court should therefore review the
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Tax Commission's decision under the substantial evidence standard applicable to factual
findings. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a) (2004); Schmidt at f6.
ISSUE NO, 2
Did the Baggetts present the Tax Commission with sufficient evidence under the
Schmidt methodology to support the Tax Commission's Final Decision to value the
Baggetts' land at zero?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
As discussed above, factual findings should be reviewed according to the
substantial evidence standard. Id.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
AND STATUTES
Utah Const. Art XIII § 2(l)-(2).
(1)
So that each person and corporation pays a tax in
proportion to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible
property, all tangible property in the State that is not exempt
under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution
shall be:
(a)
assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its
fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and
(b)

taxed at a uniform and equal rate.

(2)
Each corporation and person in the State or doing
business in the State is subject to taxation on the tangible
property owned or used by the corporation or person within
the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12) (2004).
(12) "Fair market value" means the amount at which
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
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sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant
facts.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301 (2004),
The county assessor shall assess all property located within
the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the
commission.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (2004),
All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a
uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law.
Utah Code Ann, § 59-l-610(l)(a) and (b) (2004).
(1)
When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court shall:
(a)
grant the commission deference concerning its written
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on
review; and
(b)
grant the commission no deference concerning its
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard,
unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a
statute at issue before the appellate court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding is the Board's appeal of the Tax Commission's Final Decision to
value the Baggetts' contaminated land at zero. In its Final Decision, the Tax Commission
also sustained the Board's value of $244,900 for the Baggetts' house. Although the
Board's characterization of the issues may suggest otherwise, this is a straightforward
and simple property tax case.
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For 2002, the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office valued the Baggetts' house and
land at $364,900 ($103,700 for the land and $261,200 for the house). R. at 439. The
Baggetts appealed their assessment to the Board based on the Tax Commission's decision
in Schmidt. Id. Since much of this appeal is governed by Schmidt, a brief overview of
Schmidt is appropriate at this point.
Schmidt involved a residential home near the Baggetts' property that is also
situated on contaminated land. The Schmidts appealed their assessed value to the Tax
Commission under the theory that their property had a negative value because the
remediation costs for their contaminated land far exceeded their property's total value.
The Tax Commission agreed with the Schmidts' basic argument, but declined to reduce
the total value of their property (house and land) to zero. Instead, the Tax Commission
bifurcated the value of the Schmidts' property and reduced the value of the Schmidts'
land to zero, but sustained the assessed value on the Schmidt's house.

The Tax

Commission reasoned that the house had some value since the Schmidts continued to live
there, and because their house was not contaminated. Id. The Utah Supreme Court
ultimately sustained the Tax Commission's methodology in Schmidt. Schmidt v. Salt
Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d 690. (See addendum). Like
Schmidt, the cost of remediating the Baggetts' land exceeded the land's assessed value
for 2002.
At a December 3, 2002 Board hearing, the value of the Baggetts' property was
reduced to $288,500 ($43,600 for the land and $244,900 for the house). R. at 439. At
this hearing, the Baggetts were informed that Schmidt was not controlling in their
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situation, which is presumably why the Board did not value the Baggetts' land at zero. R.
at 96.
On January 24, 2003, the Baggetts filed a Request for Redetermination with the
Tax Commission to have their case heard de novo. R. at 438. On June 2, 2003, a formal
hearing took place at the Tax Commission before Administrative Law Judge Jane Phan.
On June 26, 2003, the Tax Commission issued its Final Decision which followed the
methodology in Schmidt and valued the Baggetts' land at zero. Also, as was done in
Schmidt, the Tax Commission sustained the Board's value for the Baggetts' house, at
$244,900. R. at 178-187.
On July 22, 2003, the Board filed its Petition for Judicial Review with the Utah
Supreme Court. R. at 189. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2004), the Board's
petition was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. On November 10,
2003, the Board filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, which the Baggetts opposed. In
footnote No. 1 in its Brief, the Board indicates that it inquired of the Baggetts to see
whether they would be willing to stipulate to a dismissal. The Board claims the Baggetts
coupled any stipulation with conditions to which the Board could not agree. The Board,
however, fails to indicate that the only condition the Baggetts required was that the Board
follow Schmidt with respect to their property until it has been remediated. Accordingly,
the sole reason the Baggetts opposed dismissal of the Board's appeal is the Board's
refusal to follow the Schmidt case, thereby forcing the Baggetts to appeal year after year
on essentially the same facts.

The Baggetts believe the Board's resistance to follow

Schmidt is unjust to them and others similarly situated.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1996, the Baggetts purchased a house near the mouth of Little Cottonwood
Canyon for $390,000 using conventional financing. R. at 90-91, 235. The Baggetts' real
property parcel number is 28-12-151-008. Their street address is 9682 South Quail Ridge
Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. R. at 235. The Baggetts' house sits on .65 acres. The house
has 2,858 square feet above grade and 2,210 square feet below grade, of which 1,989 is
finished. R. at 238. Unknown to the Baggetts when they purchased their house, the land
underneath and surrounding the house was and is contaminated with trace amounts of
lead and arsenic, which presumably came from the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelters that
were operated near the Baggett's property from 1871-1879. R. at 19, 20, & 217. Both
smelters processed ore for lead and silver, taken from mines located near Alta, Utah. R. at
217.
The contamination was originally discovered in 1991. In 1992, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Utah Department of Environmental
Quality ("UDEQ") performed preliminary investigations with respect to the contaminated
property, and the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelter sites were placed on the CERCLA
Information System List ("CERCLIS"). R. at 234. The Baggetts' property is located
within the Davenport Smelter Site. R. at 217, 228-229, 247.
In January of 2000, the EPA proposed that the Flagstaff and Davenport Smelter
Sites be placed on the Superfund National Priorities List ("NPL"). R. at 217. Sometime in
December of 2000, UDEQ sent a letter to affected property owners indicating that the
Flagstaff and Davenport Superfund Site would be placed on the NPL. R. at 25, 252. The
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letter also indicates that the EPA and the UDEQ intend to pay for any remediation costs. R.
at 233. The EPA and UDEQ, however, are not required to pay for the remediation costs if
funding is not provided for by Congress. R. at 30-32, 256.
In 2001, UDEQ and the EPA commissioned a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study that identified the contaminants present in the area and the range/depth of the
contamination. R. at 219. In May 2002, the UDEQ and the EPA issued its Davenport and
Flagstaff Smelters Superfund Site Proposed Plan.

R. at 215.

In this Plan, the EPA

established the action levels for the Davenport and Flagstaff Smelters Site, which are 600
parts per million for lead and 126 parts per million for arsenic. R. at 26, 219.
After a public hearing and input, the UDEQ and EPA decided upon a remediation
plan. R. at 277. Under this plan, all contaminated soil in areas of non-native vegetation will
be removed up to a depth of 18 inches and replaced with clean soil and similar landscaping.
R. at 278. In addition, native vegetation will not be removed, but will be hand-excavated to a
maximum depth of 18 inches and replaced with clean soil. R. at 277, 278. Once remediation
has been completed, institutional controls, such as deed restrictions, may be placed on the
remediated property. R. at 278. The Baggetts' property was tested in 1998 and was shown
to have samples above the action levels for lead. The Baggetts' property did not have
any samples that were above the action levels for arsenic. R. at 46, 283, 330.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
As noted above, the two primary issues in this case are very straightforward.
Those two issues are: (1) whether it was proper for the Tax Commission to follow the
methodology used in Schmidt, and (2) whether the Baggetts presented enough evidence
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under the Schmidt methodology to support the Tax Commission's decision to value their
land at zero.
Despite the clarity of these two issues, the Board's brief winds its way through
numerous arguments without fully satisfying the Board's primary burden to "marshal the
evidence." As noted above, the issues in this case are to be reviewed by this Court under
the "substantial evidence" standard, which means the Tax Commission's factual findings
will be upheld if they "are supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a
whole."

See, e.g., Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992).

"Substantial evidence" is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n., 1999 UT 90, f 7, 987 P.2d 594, 597.
For an appellant to prevail under a "substantial evidence" standard, the appellant
must "marshal the evidence," which means "one challenging the verdict must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict [or Tax Commission findings] and then demonstrate
that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."
See, e.g., Neeley v. Bennett, 2002 UT App. 189, f 2, 51 P.3d 724, 726; Morgan County v.
Holnam, Inc., 2001 UT 57 n. 8, 29 P.3d 629, n. 8 (dismissing Morgan County's argument
that Holnam's purchases of machinery and equipment were not made in the ordinary
course of business because the County failed to marshal the evidence to the contrary);
Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, f 15, 979 P.2d 338 (The challenging party "must marshal
the evidence in support of the [trial court's] findings and then demonstrate that despite
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
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weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous."); Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT
App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431 (the court of appeals does not review the trial court's factual
findings where the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the evidence.
Instead, the court of appeals must "assume that the record supports the findings of the
trial court").
In its Brief, the Board does not meet its burden of marshaling the evidence. The
Board simply lists the evidence which supports the Tax Commission's Final Decision,
but nowhere does it adequately explain why such evidence is not substantial under the
Schmidt methodology.

Board's Brief at 20-22.

The Board merely asserts that it

presented evidence that is contrary to the Tax Commission's findings. Such an assertion
does not make it clear why the Baggetts' evidence should not have been relied upon by
the Tax Commission or how the Tax Commission abused its discretion, as a trier of fact,
in accepting the Baggetts' evidence. Therefore, because the Board fails to meet this
threshold burden, its main argument - that the Tax Commission's decision to value the
Baggetts' land at zero is erroneous - must likewise fail.
Even though the Board fails to "marshal the evidence," it nevertheless attempts to
show that the Tax Commission's decision is erroneous by making numerous tangential
arguments, which can be summarized as follows. First, the Board argues Mr. Baggett's
testimony cannot be accepted because he is not a certified appraiser. Board's Brief at 17.
Second, the Board thinks it should have prevailed before the Tax Commission because it
presented evidence that supported a higher value for the Baggetts' land. Board's Brief at
19.
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methodology to value the Baggetts' land because other jurisdictions have used different
methodologies to value contaminated property. Board's Brief at 27. Fourth, the Board
claims the value of the Baggetts' land cannot be zero since the Baggetts will not have to
pay for any remediation costs and because the Baggetts did not submit an appraisal to
support a zero value for their land. Board's Brief at 34.
As was the case before the Tax Commission, the Board's characterization of the
issues misses the mark; they are non sequiturs, and all of the Board's arguments can be
dismissed as follows. First, at no point did Mr. Baggett testify as to his property's value
or claim to be a certified appraiser. R. at 76-85. He truthfully admitted that he did not
know the standards and techniques that appraisers use. R. at 86. But that was not the
point of Mr. Baggett's testimony. Instead, Mr. Baggett's testimony was given to assist
the Tax Commission in determining the proportion of the estimated remediation costs
prepared by the EPA and UDEQ (not Mr. Baggett) that should be allocated to the
Baggetts' property.

R. at 282-290.

Anyone having a rudimentary knowledge of

mathematics could have done that task. Certainly Mr. Baggett, who is a professional
engineer, is capable and highly qualified to perform such an allocation. R. at 76-83.
However, even if Mr. Baggett were not so qualified, the outcome in this case would not
change. Anyone capable of performing simple calculations would be qualified to present
testimony as to the manner in which the remediation cost estimates are allocable to the
Baggetts' property.
Second, the Board essentially argues that because it presented evidence in support
of a higher value, it should have prevailed before the Tax Commission. The Board,
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however, forgets that it is not only the quantum of evidence but, more importantly, the
quality of the evidence that is taken into consideration. Utah Ass 'n of Counties v. Tax
Comm'n of Utah, 895 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). Even though the
Baggetts may have presented less evidence quantitatively, their evidence directly and
persuasively showed the remediation costs attributable to their land exceeded the land's
market value.
Third, the Board argues the Tax Commission erred in applying the Schmidt
methodology in this case. However, because the facts in this case are substantially
identical to those in Schmidt, common sense and reason along with the constitutional
principles of uniformity and equality require that the Tax Commission apply the same
methodology in valuing the Baggetts' land as they did in Schmidt. Furthermore, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated that the choice of which valuation methodology to be used is a
factual decision left to the Tax Commission's discretion. Schmidt at %6. Thus, the Tax
Commission's decision to apply the Schmidt methodology may not be overturned by this
Court unless there is no evidence to support the Tax Commission's decision. As will be
demonstrated below, there is substantial evidence on which to affirm. A trier of fact is
free to accept the evidence it finds most persuasive, i.e., not all evidence is of equal
probative value.
Finally, the Board goes to great lengths to argue that, because the Baggetts may
not have to pay for the costs associated with remediating their property, their land cannot
possibly have a zero value. However, until the remediation is completed and the EPA
and UDEQ have paid all costs and expenses, the Baggetts have nothing but promises. In
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other words, the Baggetts do not have a legally enforceable right to force the EPA and
UDEQ to pay for the remediation of their property. R. at 30-32, 256. Mere promises of
possible future clean up does not change the present condition of the contaminated soil.
The land's present value, not possible future value, is the base of present taxation.
In addition, the Board argues that the Tax Commission cannot determine the fair
market value of the Baggetts' property without using an appraisal, and since the Baggetts
did not present a formal appraisal, the Tax Commission must follow the appraisal the
Board submitted. This is defective thinking. An appraisal, especially the appraisal in this
case, does not determine a property's fair market value when important facts are ignored.
The mere label "appraisal" carries no probative weight. Fair market value is instead
determined by consideration of all facts and circumstances surrounding a property, which
an appraisal may or may not address. The Tax Commission gave the Board's appraisal
due consideration but significantly noted that "none of the comparables chosen ... were
contaminated." Final Decision f 11; R. at 181. In other words, the Board's appraisal
"comparables" were not actually comparable to the subject property. Thus, the Tax
Commission considered the Board's appraisal, but declined to follow it as it did not
represent credible evidence.
Having exposed the transparent and illusory nature of all of the Board's
arguments, the Baggetts will address the two primary issues in this case.

First, the

Baggetts demonstrate that constitutional principles of uniformity and equality mandate
the use of the Schmidt methodology in this case. Moreover, the Baggetts assert that
common sense, coupled with the Tax Commission's discretion to choose which valuation
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methodology best determines fair market value under the facts and circumstances
presented are enough support, standing alone, to affirm the Tax Commission's decision to
apply the Schmidt methodology. Second, the Baggetts explain that the Record proves
they presented a prima facie case under Schmidt to support their land being valued at
zero.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY FOLLOWED SCHMIDT.
In Schmidt, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "We have held that the choice of

valuation methodology used in fixing the value of property is a question of fact."
Schmidt at f 6. Thus, as a question of fact, the manner in which contaminated property is
valued for property tax purposes is left to the discretion of the Tax Commission
depending upon the individual facts and circumstances of each case. Id. The Baggetts
accept this principle and acknowledge that different facts may call for the application of
different valuation methodologies.

However, by the same logic, when a taxpayer

presents facts that are substantially identical to those of a prior case, taxpayer reliance
upon the methodology used in the prior case is appropriate. In other words, if the facts
are the same, what rational basis supports using a different methodology rather than a
methodology that has already been tested and upheld against challenge?

If the Tax

Commission were to use different methodologies for cases involving substantially
identical facts, the risks are compounded that the Tax Commission either could or would
violate its Constitutional mandate to ensure that property is assessed uniformly and
equally. Utah Const. Art. XIII § 2(l)-(2) (emphasis added).
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The converse of this principle has been recognized in Amax Magnesium Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 874 R2d 840, 842-43 (Utah 1994), in which the Utah
Supreme Court held that if identical methodologies were used to value state and county
property, "it is unconstitutional to give county property a reduction without giving state
property the same reduction." Id. Theoretically, all methodologies are intended to arrive
at the "fair market value" standard. Consequently, there is no constitutional violation per
se in using different methodologies on identical properties.

Yet the likelihood that

assessments using different methodologies on substantially identical properties will
violate constitutional requirements of uniformity necessarily increases the more disparate
methodologies are used. This is because, as the Utah Supreme Court has recognized,
different methodologies are based upon theoretical analyses that typically reflect different
factual premises. "Residential, commercial, transportation, mining, and public utilities,
etc., must be treated differently because of the economic conditions that give value to
such properties." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 188 (Utah 1984).
Where the properties and corresponding facts are substantially identical, however, there
is no rational basis for application of dissimilar methodologies, when one methodology
has already been used, tested and upheld.
This conclusion is consistent with the concept of "fair market value," statutorily
defined as "the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12). This
statutory definition suggests that a property has but one "fair market value." If one
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methodology yields one value and another methodology yields another value (as is often
the case), the Tax Commission is obliged to decide which methodology best
approximates the statutory definition of "fair market value" under the facts and
circumstances.

That is what the Tax Commission did in Schmidt, which the Utah

Supreme Court affirmed. Having made the decision that the Schmidt methodology best
approximates fair market value in this type of case, the Tax Commission would risk
arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional treatment of taxpayers, were it to abandon its prior
decisions in determining fair market value when confronted with virtually identical facts,
as is the case with the Baggetts. The constitutional principles of uniformity and equality
demand consistency between taxpayers. Thus, the Board may disagree with how Schmidt
was decided, and it may apply a different methodology under a different set of facts and
circumstances; however, in this case, the principles of equality and uniformity mandate
that it follow Schmidt.

In its Brief, none of the Board's arguments advance any

meaningful distinctions between the facts in this case and those in Schmidt. All of the
Board's

arguments cite to different

factual

circumstances

and

noncontrolling

jurisdictions.
Even if an argument can be made that the Tax Commission is not constitutionally
required to use the Schmidt methodology, the decision to apply the Schmidt methodology
is still a factual determination within the Tax Commission's express discretion. Based
solely on the principles of common sense and stare decisis, the Tax Commission is
entitled to apply the same methodology for similarly situated taxpayers. Thus, these two
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principles represent a substantial basis for the Tax Commission's decision to apply the
Schmidt methodology in this case.
Having determined that Schmidt is controlling, or at the very least, within the Tax
Commission's discretion, all of the Board's ancillary arguments as to value and the
methodologies employed by other jurisdictions are irrelevant. Consequently, the only
remaining issue is whether the Baggetts presented a prima facie case under Schmidt to
support a zero value for their land.
II.

THE BAGGETTS MET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF.
To make a prima facie case under Schmidt, a taxpayer is required to prove that

remediation costs for his or her land exceed the land's assessed value. In addition,
Schmidt also stands for the proposition that it is only the land's value that may be
reduced. As demonstrated below, the Baggetts presented substantial evidence to show
that remediation costs allocable to their land exceeded their land's value. In addition, at
no point have the Baggetts argued that their house's value should be reduced.
In support of their claim, the Baggetts introduced evidence directly from the EPA
and UDEQ as to the estimated costs for remediating the Davenport and Flagstaff Sites
("Cost Estimates").

R. at 282-290.

Arguably, these Cost Estimates, without any

additional evidence, represent substantial evidence for the Tax Commission to have
determined that the Cost Estimates allocable to the Baggetts' land exceeded the land's
value. However, in an effort to assist the Tax Commission in better understanding the
Cost Estimates, Mr. Baggett, a registered professional engineer with many years of
experience, submitted a workpaper along with his testimony explaining how the Cost
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Estimates should be allocated to his property. R. at 78, 290. Mr. Baggett's analysis was
submitted merely to assist the Tax Commission in its evaluation of the evidence, and
contrary to what the Board asserts, Mr. Baggett made every effort to make his allocations
as precise and reasonable as possible. R. at 78. Mr. Baggett's analysis was never
presented as an opinion of fair market value or as an appraisal. R. at 76-78.
Moreover, Mr. Baggett is technically qualified to provide expert testimony as to
the allocation of the Cost Estimates. As Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states,
the purpose of such testimony is to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence...."
However, even if Mr. Baggett is deemed a lay witness, his analysis is still an appropriate
form of evidence since his calculations are "helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (emphasis added).

The fact at issue in this case is what portion of the Cost

Estimates are reasonably allocable to the Baggetts' property.

After presenting his

testimony and submitting his calculations to the Tax Commission, Mr. Baggett bolstered
the credibility of his analysis by testifying that even if his analysis or the underlying Cost
Estimates were off by 50%, the Cost Estimates allocable to his property would still
exceed his land's assessed value. R. at 92-94.
Accordingly, based on the testimony the Baggetts presented, the Board cannot
make a plausible argument that the Baggetts did not present substantial evidence to
support the Tax Commission's Final Decision.

This is particularly true when you

consider that a possible error of up to 50% would not change the economic determination
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in this case. Such evidence is more than substantial and this Court should affirm the Tax
Commission's Final Decision.
CONCLUSION
This is an easy case for affirmance. The two primary issues in this case are: (1)
whether the Tax Commission properly applied the Schmidt methodology in this case, and
(2) whether the Baggetts presented enough evidence under Schmidt for the Tax
Commission to have ruled in their favor. As for the first issue, the Board may believe
that other methodologies are more appropriate, but the law requires the Tax Commission
to apply the Schmidt methodology in this case. Second, the Baggetts presented more than
enough evidence to support a zero value for their land under Schmidt. Therefore, because
substantial evidence supports the Tax Commission's decision with respect to both issues,
this Court must affirm the Tax Commission's Final Decision.
DATED this _2_ day of November, 2004.

MAXWELL A. MILLER
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW
MATTHEW D. WRIDE
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Daniel Baggett
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first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
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Thomas W. Peters
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
2001 South State Street, S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Michelle Bush
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Tab A

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
JEFF Ec VICTORIA SCHMIDT,

)

Petitioners,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION

v.

)

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,

)
:
)

Appeal No.

)

Tax Type: Property Tax

Respondent.

96-0914

Account No. 2812108014

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for
a Formal Hearing on July 23, 1997.

W. Val Oveson, Chairman of the

Commission, and G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge, heard
the matter

for and on behalf

of the Commission.

Present

and

representing Petitioners were Mr. Jeff Schmidt and Mrs. Victoria
Schmidt.

Present

Butterfield

and

and

Ms.

representing

Lisa

Martin,

Respondent
from

the

were

Salt

Mr.

Lake

Larry
County

Assessor's Office.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

k

The tax in question is Property Tax.

2.

The year in question is January 1, 1995

3.

The Salt Lake County Assessor originally valued the

subject property at $789,370.

Upon appeal to the Salt Lake County

Board of Equalization, a value of $706,000 was determined.

0030:

Appeal No. 96-0914

4.

The subject property is located at 3660 East Little

Cottonwood Road in Sandy, Utah.
5.

The subject property consists of approximately

2.7

acres of land located in the interior of a residential area, and it
contains a home which has approximately 4,4 56 square feet on the
main floor and 2589 square feet on the second floor.

The appraisal

submitted by Mr. Schmidt would show a smaller square footage for
the

home, but

the determination

of

the

square

footage

is

not

material to the ultimate decision in this case, and therefore the
commission does not make a specific finding regarding the exact
size of

the home.

The home is a very nice home of very good

quality construction, and it is in excellent condition.
6.

Petitioner and Respondent both agree that the general

value of the property

is $706,000.

However, both parties also

agree that there is lead and arsenic contamination on the property,
so the primary issue is the amount of reduction, if any, of the
fair market value of the property caused by the lead and arsenic
contaminat ion.
7.
Department

Petitioner submitted letters from the State of Utah
of

Environmental

Environmental protection Agency.

Quality

and

the

United

States

Those letters and the information

contained therewith indicate that Petitioners' property contains
lead levels as high as 4,910 parts per million, and arsenic levels
as high as 174 parts per million.

The letter from Mr. Brad T.

-2-
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Johnson,

with

Remediation

at

the

Division

the

of

Department

of

Environmental
Environmental

Response
Quality

State of Utah indicates that "clean-ups or environmental
in

the

Salt

Lake

concentrations

Valley

greater

have

been

than 500-800

milligrams per kilogram

considered

and

for

the

controls
for

parts per million

lead

(PPM)

[MG-GM]) and arsenic over 70 PPM or

(or
(MG-

KG) ."
8.

The

levels

of

lead

and

arsenic

on

Petitioners 1

property are high enough to be health risks and are significantly
greater

than

those

which

are

considered

for

superfund

cleanup.

However, whether or not the superfund would pay for the cleanup is
a question which cannot be determined, since those cleanup
are

allocated

based

upon

a

priority

basis,

and

there

funds
is

no

indication that the property of Petitioner would rise high enough
on the priority list to actually be cleaned up by the

superfund.

The superfund cleanup level is based upon those levels which may be
hazardous

to health

and

upon

the

numbers

of

people p o t e n t i a l l y

affected by any hazardous materials.
9.

One of the letters submitted by Petitioner

indicates

that the primary concern for arsenic and lead concentrations of the
level found on Petitioners' property is for small children because
they

are

more

susceptible

to

contamination than are adults.

health

problems

caused

by

such

Petitioners do have small children.
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10.

Notwithstanding the contamination on the property,

>oth Petitioners and their children do reside on the property.

It

las not been closed because of the contamination.
11.

Petitioners were not aware of the contamination on

the property until they were in the middle of constructing their
home

on

the

property.

Petitioners

had

obtained

construction

financing for the home, but they were unable to arrange permanent
financing after the contamination was discovered.
denied permanent

Petitioners were

financing on the home by Zions First National

Bank, First Security Bank, and Chase-Manhattan Bank.

The reason

for all of the declines was because of the inability to obtain
satisfactory documentation on environmental hazards.
12.
Tony

Petitioner submitted an appraisal prepared by Mr.

Parkinson,

of

Bodell-Van

Drimmelen,

Appraisers.

That

appraisal used both the cost approach and a market approach, and
then

deducted

from

the

values

of

both

approaches ^a

sum

of

$1,04 0,000 for cleanup of the contaminated land which exists on the
property.

Because the value without contamination was agreed to be

$706,000, after the deduction of remediation costs of $1,040,000,
Mr.

Parkinson

determined

a

negative

value

of

$334,000.

The

deduction for cleanup of the contaminated property used by BodellVan

Drimmelen

was

Environmental, Inc.

based

upon

an

estimate

received

from

Sitex

Petitioners submitted an estimate signed by

Mr. W. Ray Maxom, the office manager for Sitex Environmental, Inc.,
-4-
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which estimated the cleanup costs to remove 18 inches of soil, haul
the soil to an environmental disposal site, pay the disposal fee,
replace the soil with fill and topsoil, and place sod back on the
property, would be $1,04 2,252.05.
13.

Respondent submitted an appraisal prepared by Ms.

Lisa Martin, a staff appraiser for the Salt Lake County Assessor's
Office.

Ms. Martin

had

property was $706,000.

earlier

determined

the value

of

the

However, based upon a later appraisal, she

analyzed a subsequent sale within the area which was right next to
a contaminated parcel, and was previously part of a contaminated
parcel.
legal

However, the contaminated portion was severed by way of

description

contaminated-

so

that

the

parcel

which

was

sold

was

not

Based upon that sale, Ms. Martin determined that

there was a stigma to sales in the area of approximately 20%, and
the property, therefore, had a value of $563,900.

However, that

value is based upon a sale which did not have any contamination on
the parcel that was sold, and it assumes the subject property could
be sold with such a stigma attached to it.

That appraisal of

Respondent also does not make any adjustment for the unavailability
of financing, or the fact that anyone who purchased the property
may be in a chain of title of contaminated property, and therefore
subject

to

payment

of

the

full

costs

of

remediation

of

the

property.
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ANALYSIS
The Commission is convinced
contamination to the property.

that there is significant

There is uncontroverted evidence

that the contamination is at such a level that it constitutes a
health

hazard.

Petitioners

There

have

been

is

also

denied

uncontroverted

financing

from

evidence
three

that

financial

institutions because of the environmental hazards.
The

difficulty

is

determining

the

impact

of

the

contamination on the fair market value of the property.
The

normal

method

of

calculating

the

value

of

a

contaminated property is to deduct the costs of remediation from
the value of the property as calculated before any deduction for
the contamination.

If that were done in this case, it would result

in a negative value as determined by Petitioner's appraiser.
property

had a negative value, that

would

also imply

that

If a
the

property was uninhabitable.
In this case, the Petitioners and their family are able
to

reside

in

the

home

and

live

in

very

nice

circumstances.

Therefore, the home clearly has some positive value.

As long as

the home is not uninhabitable, it does have some value.
One o? the methods which could be used to calculate value
for this contaminated property would be to estimate a reasonable
rental value for the home and estimate its value based upon the
income approach to value.

In this case,

however, there was no
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testimony or evidence of the fair rental value of the home or a
similar

home

in

a

contaminated

condition.

Therefore,

3

the

Commission cannot make a reasonable estimate of the property based
upon the income approach to value.
The Commission has concluded that most of the harm to the
value of this property is because of the contamination in the soil.
The building is not contaminated and would be fine if it were in a
different location.

Therefore, the Commission believes the most

appropriate way to value this property is to reduce the value for
the

land

to

zero,

and

to

value

the

replacement cost new less depreciation

improvements
(RCNLD) .

at

their

Based upon the

appraisal of Ms. Lisa Martin, that amount is $398,166.
APPLICABLE LAW
The

Tax

Commission

is

required

to

oversee

the

just

administration of property taxes to ensure that property is valued
for tax purposes according to fair market value.

(Utah Code Ann.

§59-1-210 (7) .)
Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish that the
market

value

of

the

subject

property

is

other

than

that

as

determined by Respondent, and also has the burden of proof

to

estblish the correct fair market value of the subject property.
Where there are environmental hazards contained on the
property, the normal method of valuation is to determine the fair
market value of the property without such hazards, and to then
-7-
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deduct the cost to ci
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioners

have

sustained

the

burden

of

proof

to

establish that the market value of the subject property is other
than that previously established by Respondent-

The Petitioners

have further met their burden of proof to establish that the cost
to cure the property should be deducted from its normal fair market
value.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that
the market value of the subject property as of January 1, 1995, is
$398,166.

The Salt Lake County Auditor is hereby ordered to adjust

its records in accordance with this decision.
DATED this

7

day of () Cxdj^Y

It is so ordered.
, 1997.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

W. Val Oveson
Chairman

•*a-

Pam Hendrickson
Commissioner

3e B. Pacheco
Commissioner*

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you
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Jeff and Victoria Schmidt, Petitioners, v. Utah State Tax Commission, County Board of Equalization of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Respondents.
1999 UT 48; 980 P.2d 690; 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 34; 1999 Utah LEXIS 88
No. 970588

May 14, 1999, Filed
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
ZIMMERMAN, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice
Zimmerman's opinion. Justice Stewart concurs in the result. Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief
Justice Durham does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Norman H. Jackson sat.

Disposition
We affirmed the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166.
Counsel
Brian J. Romriell, Steven E. Hugie, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., John C. McCarrey, Asst. Att'y Gen., Mary Ellen Sloan, Salt Lake City,
for respondents.

Opinion
Editorial Information: Subsequent History
Released for Publication June 4, 1999.
Opinion by:

ZIMMERMAN

{980 P.2d 690} ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
P1 This matter is before us to review an order of the Utah State Tax Commission ("the Commission") fixing
the assessed value on residential property owned by Jeff and Victoria. Schmidt and to review the
Commission's denial of a request from the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("the Board") for
reconsideration. Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the Commission's valuation. The Schmidts argue
that their property should be valued at zero due to contamination. The Board argues that the property's value
should be higher than that fixed by the Commission. We conclude that neither the Schmidts nor the Board
met their burden of showing that the Commission's valuation was not based on substantial evidence, and
therefore, we affirm.
P2 The property at issue is residential property located on East Little Cottonwool Road in Sandy, Utah ("the
property").. The property consists of a home of approximately 7000 square feet located on 2.7 acres. The
property is located at the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon near the site where a smelter operated briefly in
the early 1870's, refining ore from the mines in the canyon. Tailings from the mill are present on at least some
of the land in varying quantities. The Board valued the property at $ 789,370 for the 1995 tax year. The
Schmidts then appealed to the Board to adjust its original valuation and notified the Board of the
contamination on the property. An independent {980 P.2d 691} hearing officer for the Board reduced the
value of the property to $ 706,000. The Schmidts then appealed to the Commission.
P3 The Commission held a formal hearing. The Schmidts argued that because the property was
contaminated with high levels of lead and arsenic, the market value should be reduced to zero. In support of
their motion, the Schmidts offered letters from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality ("UDEQ") and
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The UDEQ letter states that the three trial holes
on the 2.7 acres show that the land contains lead and arsenic at levels well above those UDEQ deems
warrant clean-ups or the putting in place of environmental controls. The Schmidts also offered as evidence a
letter containing a bid from Sitex Environmental, Inc. ("Sitex"), indicating that the removal of eighteen inches
of topsoil from the entire 2.7 acres, disposal of the contaminated soil, and replacement with clean soil would
cost $ 1,042,252.05. The Schmidts submitted an appraisal that valued the property at negative $ 334,000, a
figure reached by deducting the amount of the Sitex bid from the value that the Board had fixed for the
property. Finally, the Schmidts relied on letters from several banks that had denied permanent financing for
the property after the contamination was discovered.

o
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P4 In opposition to the evidence proffered by the Schmidts, the Board submitted several pieces of evidence
including an appraisal from Lisa Martin, an appraiser for the Salt Lake County Assessor's office. Martin
determined that the value off the land should be calculated by using the $ 706,000 figure and reducing it by
20 percent due to stigma from the contamination. A 20 percent reduction for stigma is a standard appraisal
technique. She valued the property at $ 563,900. The Board also disputed that it was necessary to remove as
much soil as the Sitex bid suggested. It argued that because only three soil samples had been taken on the
entire 2.7 acres, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the entire property was contaminated.
Furthermore, the Board pointed out that there was no evidence that the EPA or UDEQ would require any sort
of a clean-up on this residential property. Finally, the Board offered evidence that the problem had been
partially cured when the Schmidts placed additional topsoil on portions of the 2.7 acres.
P5 In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision, the Commission found that the fair market
value of the land was zero but that the fair market value of the home was $ 398,166, It explained this result m
the following manner. While "the normal method of calculating the value of a contaminated property is to
deduct the costs of remediation from the value of the property as calculated before any deduction for
contamination . . . in this case, it would result in a negative value . . . . If a property had a negative value, that
would also imply that the property was uninhabitable." Because petitioners and their small children live in the
home, and "in very nice circumstances," the Commission reasoned that the property must have some positive
value. The normal valuation methodology was not used because it produced a number that did not reflect
reality. Since the Commission determined that the property had "value-in-use, M i it came up with an alternative
methodology. The Commission treated the land and the home separately. It did this because the building
itself was not contaminated and the harm to the value of the overall property was due to the contamination in
the soil; It therefore set the value of the land at zero and the value of the building at. $ 398,166, a figure
reached by using the standard replacement cost new less depreciation method. The result was a valuation for
the house and land of $ 398,166.
P6 The issue before this court is whether the Commission committed reversible error in fixing the property's
value at $ 398,166. We first address the standard of review. We have held that the choice of valuation
methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a question of fact. See Beaver County v. {980 P.2d 692}
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 355 (Utah 1996) (holding that Commission's decision to reject a
certain valuation methodology is a finding of fact). Therefore, we "grant the commission deference
concerning its written findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard of review." Utah Code Ann. §
59-1-610 (1)(a) (1996). Furthermore, "when reviewing an agency's decision, this court does n o t . . . reweigh
the evidence." Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993).
P7 Under this standard, we uphold the Commissions findings of fact if they are "'supported by substantial
evidence based upon the record as a whole.'" Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax. Comm'n,
922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852
(Utah 1992)). "Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence which is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. See Cache County, 922 P.2d at 767; Utah Ass'n of
Counties v. Tax Comm'n of Utah, 895P.2d819, 821 (Utah 1995); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 877P.2d169,172
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) In addition, a party challenging the Commission's factual findings bears the burden of
marshaling all evidence supporting the findings and showing that this evidence is insufficient. See Kennecott
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381,1385 (Utah 1993); First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165.
P8 Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the Commission's factual findings. The Schmidts argue that
the Commission erred in valuing the home and the land separately. The Board argues that the Commission
erred in fixing the land's value at zero and argues that the Commission should have used the Board's
valuation for the house and land, making a percentage reduction for stigma instead.
P9 The Commission was not bound to accept either the Schmidts' or the Board's valuations; it "has the
discretion to adopt a figure that [falls] somewhere between . . . polarized estimates." Utah Ass'n of Counties,
895 P.2d at 823. What is required of the Commission is that it value the property based on its "fair market
value." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1996)2 "Fair market value" has been statutorily defined as: "the
amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge off the relevant facts." Id. § 59-21_02(8) (1996).3 In arriving at the fair market value, this court has said that the Commission uses one of the
following recognized approaches: cost, income, and market. See Beaver County, 916 P.2d at 347. The cost
approach determines the property value based on its replacement cost less depreciation. See id. The income
approach determines property value by computing the present value of anticipated income. See id. The
\J >J v> I
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market approach determines property value by examining the prices at which comparable properties have
been bought and sold. See id.
P10 The Commission stated that the "normal method" of calculating the value of contaminated property is to
deduct the costs of remediation from the value of the property as calculated before any deduction for the
contamination. However, the Commission decided not to apply the "normal method." Instead, it attempted to
fix the value of the property in use. This court has never established a proper method for fixing the value of
contaminated property. Other jurisdictions have. Some have applied a method similar to the Commission's
"normal method." See, e.g., AlmorCorp. v. County of Hennepin, 566 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1997) (holding
that in {980 P.2d 693} cases where property is a Superfund site and experts agree that clean-up cost should
be deducted from appraisal value, court should deduct clean-up cost from value of property); Westling v.
County of Mifle Lacs, 543 N.W.2d 91. (Minn. 1996) (upholding tax court's reduction of value to zero based on
reduction for clean-up). But others have not accepted that the cost of clean-up ought to be fully deducted
from the value of the property. See, e.g., Boekeloo v. Bd. of Review of Clinton, 529 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa
1995) (finding that most courts that have fixed value of contaminated properties acknowledge that
contamination has an adverse effect and require assessors to consider effect of contamination on property);
Inmar Assoc, Inc. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 549 A.2d 38, 44-45 (N.J. 1988) (suggesting that
appraisers view properties like special-purpose properties or consider value-in-use to owner); Bonnie H.
Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 885,
906 (1992) ("For varying reasons, the majority of cases have rejected taxpayers' assertions of zero or nominal
value."); Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties, 56 Appraisal J. 7,13 (1988) (stating that it is
not reasonable to conclude that contaminated property is unmarketable when it is being used for its intended
purpose, but suggesting consideration of stigma and value-in-use).4
P11 Here, the Commission made a judgment about the value-in-use of the home and the land. The evidence
before it valued the property between $ 706,000 and zero. The Commission has the discretion to take that
conflicting evidence into account and to arrive at a number in between. See Utah Ass'n of Counties, 895 P.2d
at 823. It did so in this case. The Schmidts and the Board have not carried their burden of demonstrating that
the resulting valuation is without substantial evidentiary support in the record. There was evidence in the
record that the clean-up would cost over a million dollars. That evidence was not, however, very persuasive.
The Sitex bid was based only on three soil samples on the entire 2.7 acres. It showed varying degrees of
toxicity at the different sampling sites. The uniform property-wide remedy Sitex suggested was thus not
tailored to the site. The Commission could have reasonably concluded that the bid was excessive. At the
same time, the Commission had other evidence that the simple mathematical deduction of clean-up costs
from the initial appraisal did not reflect the real usable value of the property, or the actual impairment that
resulted from the contamination. The Schmidts brought new topsoil onto the property. They live on the
property in a large house with their small children. They have a vegetable garden on the property and
consume the vegetables. No agency had required any clean-up or had even done an evaluation of the
property. Based on all this, we cannot say that the Commission's valuation was not supported by substantial
evidence. The evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable mind to accept it as supporting the
Commission's conclusion. This is particularly the case where, as here, the propriety of the Commission's
methodology of valuing the land and the house separately is a question of fact and not law.
P12 In conclusion, we affirm the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166.
P13 Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice Zimmerman's opinion.
{980 P.2d 694} P14 Justice Stewart concurs in the result
P15 Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief Justice Durham does not participate herein; Court of Appeals
Judge Norman H. Jackson sat.
Footnotes
Footnotes
M
1
Value-in-use" was defined by the Iowa Supreme Court in Boekeloo v. Board of Review of Clinton, 529
N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1995), when it held that "the transitory absence of a market does not eliminate value . . . .
The mere fact that a property is unmarketable does not mean it has no value, especially when it is being used
for its intended purpose." Id. at 278.

2

Section 59-2-103 states:
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(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its
fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law.
3
Section 59-2-102(8) is now codified at section 59-2-102(9). The change to section 59-2-102 occurred in
1998 and does not affect this case.
4
The Board also argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in reducing the value of the land to
zero. It contends that the Commission should only reduce the value of property by the cost of a clean-up
where the taxpayer has shown all the following: the land is contaminated, the taxpayer is required to clean up
the land, and the taxpayer can show with reasonable certainty the cost of a clean-up. The Board relies on a
Washington case, Weyerhaeuser Co, v. Easter, 126 Wash. 2d 370, 894 P.2d 1290, 1298 (Wash. 1995). We
decline to adopt the l/Veyer/iaeusertest in this case or to mandate an element of the valuation methodology.
First, we have heretofore declined to detail a methodology for reaching a fair market value as a matter of law.
Second, Weyerhaeuser involved a paper mill which was required to install pollution control devices. Here we
are dealing with the fair market value of a residential property. While the lack of a conclusive clean-up
estimate may be relevant to fixing the value, we are not persuaded that its absence should mean that the
contamination must be ignored, as Weyerhaeuser would require.
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JUDGES
ZIMMERMAN, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice
Zimmerman's opinion. Justice Stewart concurs in the result. Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief
Justice Durham does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Norman H. Jackson sat.
AUTHOR: ZIMMERMAN
OPINION

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
{1} This matter is before us to review an order of the Utah State Tax Commission ("the
Commission") fixing the assessed value on residential property owned by Jeff and Victoria.
Schmidt and to review the Commission's denial of a request from the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization ("the Board") for reconsideration. Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the
Commission's valuation. The Schmidts argue that their property should be valued at zero due to
contamination. The Board argues that the property's value should be higher than that fixed by the
Commission. We conclude that neither the Schmidts nor the Board met their burden of showing
that the Commission's valuation was not based on substantial evidence, and therefore, we affirm.
{2} The property at issue is residential property located on East Little Cottonwood Road in
Sandy, Utah ("the property").. The property consists of a home of approximately 7000 square feet
located on 2.7 acres. The property is located at the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon near the
site where a smelter operated briefly in the early 1870's, refining ore from the mines in the
canyon. Tailings from the mill are present on at least some of the land in varying quantities. The
Board valued the property at $ 789,370 for the 1995 tax year. The Schmidts then appealed to the
Board to adjust its original valuation and notified the Board of the contamination on the property.
An independent hearing officer for the Board reduced the value of the property to $ 706,000.
The Schmidts then appealed to the Commission.
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. AH rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
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{3} The Commission held a formal hearing. The Schmidts argued that because the property
was contaminated with high levels of lead and arsenic, the market value should be reduced to
zero. In support of their motion, the Schmidts offered letters from the Utah Department of
Environmental Quality ("UDEQ") and the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") . The UDEQ letter states that the three trial holes on the 2.7 acres show that the land
contains lead and arsenic at levels well above those UDEQ deems warrant clean-ups or the
putting in place of environmental controls. The Schmidts also offered as evidence a letter
containing a bid from Sitex Environmental, Inc. ("Sitex"), indicating that the removal of eighteen
inches of topsoil from the entire 2.7 acres, disposal of the contaminated soil, and replacement
with clean soil would cost $ 1,042,252.05. The Schmidts submitted an appraisal that valued the
property at negative $ 334,000, a figure reached by deducting the amount of the Sitex bid from
the value that the Board had fixed for the property. Finally, the Schmidts relied on letters from
several banks that had denied permanent financing for the property after the contamination was
discovered.
{4} In opposition to the evidence proffered by the Schmidts, the Board submitted several
pieces of evidence including an appraisal from Lisa Martin, an appraiser for the Salt Lake County
Assessor's office. Martin determined that the value off the land should be calculated by using the
$ 706,000 figure and reducing it by 20 percent due to stigma from the contamination. A 20
percent reduction for stigma is a standard appraisal technique. She valued the property at $
563,900. The Board also disputed that it was necessary to remove as much soil as the Sitex bid
suggested. It argued that because only three soil samples had been taken on the entire 2.7 acres,
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the entire property was contaminated. Furthermore,
the Board pointed out that there was no evidence that the EPA or UDEQ would require any sort
of a clean-up on this residential property. Finally, the Board offered evidence that the problem
had been partially cured when the Schmidts placed additional topsoil on portions of the 2.7 acres.
{5} In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision, the Commission found that
the fair market value of the land was zero but that the fair market value of the home was $
398,166. It explained this result in the following manner. While "the normal method of
calculating the value of a contaminated property is to deduct the costs of remediation from the
value of the property as calculated before any deduction for contamination . . . in this case, it
would result in a negative value . . . . If a property had a negative value, that would also imply
that the property was uninhabitable." Because petitioners and their small children live in the
home, and "in very nice circumstances," the Commission reasoned that the property must have
some positive value. The normal valuation methodology was not used because it produced a
number that did not reflect reality. Since the Commission determined that the property had
"value-in-use," 1 it came up with an alternative methodology. The Commission treated the land
and the home separately. It did this because the building itself was not contaminated and the
harm to the value of the overall property was due to the contamination in the soil; It therefore set
the value of the land at zero and the value of the building at. $ 398,166, a figure reached by using
the standard replacement cost new less depreciation method. The result was a valuation for the
€> 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
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house and land of $ 398,166.
{6} The issue before this court is whether the Commission committed reversible error in
fixing the property's value at $ 398,166. We first address the standard of review. We have held
that the choice of valuation methodology used in fixing the value of a property is a question of
fact. See Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 355 (Utah 1996) (holding
that Commission's decision to reject a certain valuation methodology is a finding of fact) .
Therefore, we "grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, applying a
substantial evidence standard of review." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (l)(a) (1996). Furthermore,
"when reviewing an agency's decision, this court does not . . . reweigh the evidence." Questar
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993).
{7} Under this standard, we uphold the Commissions findings of fact if they are "'supported
by substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole/" Cache County v. Property Tax
Div. of Utah State Tax. Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting
Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992)). "Substantial evidence" is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion. See Cache County, 922 P.2d at 767; Utah Ass f n of Counties v. Tax
Comm'n of Utah, 895 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1995); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
877 P.2d 169, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) In addition, a party challenging the Commission's
factual findings bears the burden of marshaling all evidence supporting the findings and showing
that this evidence is insufficient. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d
1381, 1385 (Utah 1993); First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165.
{8} Both the Schmidts and the Board challenge the Commission's factual findings. The
Schmidts argue that the Commission erred in valuing the home and the land separately. The
Board argues that the Commission erred in fixing the land's value at zero and argues that the
Commission should have used the Board's valuation for the house and land, making a percentage
reduction for stigma instead.
{9} The Commission was not bound to accept either the Schmidts' or the Board's valuations;
it "has the discretion to adopt a figure that [falls] somewhere between . . . polarized estimates."
Utah Ass'n of Counties, 895 P.2d at 823. What is required of the Commission is that it value the
property based on its "fair market value." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1996) 2 "Fair
market value" has been statutorily defined as: "the amount at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell
and both having reasonable knowledge off the relevant facts." Id. § 59-2-102(8) (1996).^ In
arriving at the fair market value, this court has said that the Commission uses one of the
following recognized approaches: cost, income, and market. See Beaver County, 916 P.2d at
347. The cost approach determines the property value based on its replacement cost less
depreciation. See id. The income approach determines property value by computing the present
value of anticipated income. See id. The market approach determines property value by
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.^ a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
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examining the prices at which comparable properties have been bought and sold. See id.
{10} The Commission stated that the "normal method" of calculating the value of
contaminated property is to deduct the costs of remediation from the value of the property as
calculated before any deduction for the contamination. However, the Commission decided not to
apply the "normal method." Instead, it attempted to fix the value of the property in use. This
court has never established a proper method for fixing the value of contaminated property. Other
jurisdictions have. Some have applied a method similar to the Commission's "normal method."
See, e.g., Almor Corp. v. County of Hennepin, 566 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1997) (holding
that in cases where property is a Superfimd site and experts agree that clean-up cost should be
deducted from appraisal value, court should deduct clean-up cost from value of property);
Westling v. County of Mille Lacs, 543 N.W.2d 91. (Minn. 1996) (upholding tax court's
reduction of value to zero based on reduction for clean-up). But others have not accepted that the
cost of clean-up ought to be fully deducted from the value of the property. See, e.g., Boekeloo v.
Bd. of Review of Clinton, 529 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 1995) (finding that most courts that have
fixed value of contaminated properties acknowledge that contamination has an adverse effect
and require assessors to consider effect of contamination on property); I n m a r Assoc, Inc. v.
Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N J . 593, 549 A.2d 38, 44-45 (NJ. 1988) (suggesting that appraisers
view properties like special-purpose properties or consider value-in-use to owner); Bonnie H.
Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. EnvtL
Aff L. Rev. 885, 906 (1992) ("For varying reasons, the majority of cases have rejected taxpayers'
assertions of zero or nominal value."); Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties,
56 Appraisal J. 7, 13 (1988) (stating that it is not reasonable to conclude that contaminated
property is unmarketable when it is being used for its intended purpose, but suggesting
consideration of stigma and value-in-use).^
{11} Here, the Commission made a judgment about the value-in-use of the home and the
land. The evidence before it valued the property between $ 706,000 and zero. The Commission
has the discretion to take that conflicting evidence into account and to arrive at a number in
between. See Utah Assfn of Counties, 895 P.2d at 823. It did so in this case. The Schmidts and
the Board have not carried their burden of demonstrating that the resulting valuation is without
substantial evidentiary support in the record. There was evidence in the record that the clean-up
would cost over a million dollars. That evidence was not, however, very persuasive. The Sitex
bid was based only on three soil samples on the entire 2.7 acres. It showed varying degrees of
toxicity at the different sampling sites. The uniform property-wide remedy Sitex suggested was
thus not tailored to the site. The Commission could have reasonably concluded that the bid was
excessive. At the same time, the Commission had other evidence that the simple mathematical
deduction of clean-up costs from the initial appraisal did not reflect the real usable value of the
property, or the actual impairment that resulted from the contamination. The Schmidts brought
new topsoil onto the property. They live on the property in a large house with their small
children. They have a vegetable garden on the property and consume the vegetables. No agency
had required any clean-up or had even done an evaluation of the property. Based on all this, we
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cannot say that the Commission's valuation was not supported by substantial evidence. The
evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable mind to accept it as supporting the Commission's
conclusion. This is particularly the case where, as here, the propriety of the Commission's
methodology of valuing the land and the house separately is a question of fact and not law.
{12} In conclusion, we affirm the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166.
{13} Chief Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Judge Jackson concur in Justice Zimmerman's
opinion.
PI4 Justice Stewart concurs in the result
{15} Having disqualified herself, Associate Chief Justice Durham does not participate
herein; Court of Appeals Judge Norman H. Jackson sat.
DISPOSITION
We affirmed the Commission's valuation of the property at $ 398,166.

OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 "Vaiue-in-use" was defined by the Iowa Supreme Court in Boekeloo v. Board of Review of
Clinton, 529 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1995), when it held that "the transitory absence of a market does not
eliminate value . . . . The mere fact that a property is unmarketable does not mean it has no value,
especially when it is being used for its intended purpose." Id. at 278.
2 Section 59-2-103 states:
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis
of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by Jaw.
3 Section 59-2-102(8) is now codified at section 59-2-102(9). The change to section 59-2-102
occurred in 1998 and does not affect this case.
4 The Board also argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in reducing the value of the
land to zero, it contends that the Commission should only reduce the value of property by the cost of a
clean-up where the taxpayer has shown all the following: the land is contaminated, the taxpayer is
required to clean up the land, and the taxpayer can show with reasonable certainty the cost of a clean-up.
The Board relies on a Washington case, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Easter, 126 Wash. 2d 370, 894 P.2d
1290, 1298 (Wash. 1995) . We decline to adopt the Weyerhaeuser test in this case or to mandate an
element of the valuation methodology. First, we have heretofore declined to detail a methodology for
reaching a fair market value as a matter of law. Second, Weyerhaeuser involved a paper mill which was
required to install pollution control devices. Here we are dealing with the fair market value of a residential
property. While the lack of a conclusive clean-up estimate may be relevant to fixing the value, we are not
persuaded that its absence should mean that the contamination must be ignored, as Weyerhaeuser
would require.
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